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Federal Tax Lien-Is It Effective Against a State Homestead
Exemption?
Today most states have homestead exemptions that place a family
residence beyond the reach of creditors' remedies.1 Typically, these ex-
emptions are valid against all but a limited class of debts.2 In this era
of the omnipresent tax collector, a recurring question has been whether
the state homestead exemption is effective against the federal tax lien.3
Since the nature and extent of the homestead exemption varies greatly
from state to state,4 a comprehensive answer to this problem is not
available. A recent case, United States v. Hershberger, represents one
court's attempt to reconcile the competing interests of a state's home-
stead provisions and the federal government's desire for a uniform tax
collection system.
Ralph and Esther Hershberger jointly owned real property, which
they occupied as their residence, in Wichita, Kansas. In an attempt to
satisfy a judgment against Ralph for over 28,000 dollars in unpaid
taxes,6 the United States sought to foreclose its tax lien against Ralph's
interest in the property.7 Esther claimed that her occupancy qualified
1. The states not having homestead exemptions are Connecticut, Delaware, Indi-
ana, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See S. RIESENFELD,
CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 232-33 (1967).
2. These debts are generally of two types: (1) obligations incurred in acquiring
and preserving the homestead and (2) obligations for taxes. See generally Haskins,
Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1950).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to
tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addi-
tion thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property
and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
4. The exempted property may be described in monetary terms or acreage fig-
ures. Each state has its own requirements as to who may assert the exemption, when
it can be claimed, and the type of property interest that is within its protection. See
I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.75-.84 (A.Y. Casner ed. 1952).
5. 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973).
6. Reducing a tax claim to judgment is not necessary for all tax collection ef-
forts, but it tolls the six year statute of limitations on the federal tax lien indefinitely
and is often advisable where there may be title or priority disputes. See W. PLUMB,
FEDERAL TAX LIENS 49-51 (3d ed. 1972); Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien
Problems, 13 TAx L. REv. 247, 278-79 (1958).
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7403 (a) provides:
Filing.-n any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay
any tax, or to discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy
has been made, the Attorney General. .. may direct a civil action to be filed
in a district court of the United States to enforce the lien . . . under this
title with respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property, of what-
696 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
the residence as a homestead under Kansas law thus immunizing the
property from seizure and sale.8 The district court agreed and granted
summary judgment for the Hershbergers.9 On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.10 Following the reasoning of the
district court, the circuit court held that the homestead exemption cre-
ated an indivisible property interest in Esther that precluded the gov-
ernment from foreclosing the lien as long as she occupied the property
as her residence."1
The federal tax lien is a major weapon in the government's tax col-
lection arsenal. Arising automatically after a taxpayer refuses or neg-
lects to comply with a tax assessment, the federal tax lien attaches to
"all property or rights to property" belonging to the taxpayer.1 2 Courts
have generally followed the sweeping language of section 6321 and have
upheld the lien's attachment to a broad range of property interests, in-
cluding equitable and intangible interests, property normally exempt
under federal and state laws, and after-acquired property the moment
title passes to the taxpayer.1 3
Section 6321, however, creates no property rights but merely at-
taches federally defined rights to property interests created by state
law.14 Thus, initially, a court will look to state law to determine the na-
ture and extent of a taxpayer's property rights.15 If there is a suffi-
ever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title or interest,
to the payment of such tax or liability.
8. KAN. CoNsT. art. 15, § 9 provides:
A homestead to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres of farming land,
or of one acre within the limits of an incorporated town or city, occupied as a
residence by the family of the owner, together with all the improvements on
the same, shall be exempt from forced sale under any process of law, and shall
not be alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife, when that re-
lation exists; but no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes, or for the
payment of obligations contracted for the purchase of said premises, or for the
erection of improvements thereon. Provided, The provisions of this section
shall not apply to any process of law obtained by virtue of a lien given by
the consent of both husband and wife ....
The constitutional provisions are essentially reiterated in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301
(1964).
9. United States v. Hershberger, 338 F. Supp. 804 (D. Kan. 1972).
10. United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973).
11. Id. at 682.
12. See note 3 supra. For an excellent practical discussion of the creation and
timing of the lien see W. PLUMB, supra note 6, at 10-18.
13. This listing is by no means exhaustive but merely intended to indicate the
reach of § 6321. For a general discussion of property subject to the lien see 9 J.
MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 54.52 (rev. ed. 1971).
14. E.g., United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958) (Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 36, § 3670, 53 Stat. 448, is the predecessor to ITrr, REv. CODE or 1954, § 6321
and the language of the two sections is virtually identical).
15. E.g., Aquilino v, United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-14 (1960).
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cient property interest for the lien to attach, the court will then look to
federal law to determine the lien's effectiveness against competing in-
terests.16 However, it is unclear whether the court must look to federal
or state law to determine if the lien attaches to state property rights.
The better conclusion would seem to be that federal law should deter-
mine the question of whether the lien attaches.17
The Hershberger court recognized the validity of the lien against
Ralph's interest in the homestead," but turned its attention to Kansas
law to determine the rights of Esther in the family residence. The
Kansas Constitution and the statute enacting the homestead provision
specify that the home cannot be alienated without the joint consent of
both husband and wife and is exempt from forced sale except for
"sale for taxes, or for the payment of obligations contracted for the pur-
chase of said premises, or for the erection of improvements thereon."19
The court found no case on the issue of whether a homestead can be
sold to pay for taxes not directly related to the family residence. Never-
theless, the district court had concluded that, since neither federal nor
state income taxes had been adopted at the time the statute was en-
acted, the exception should be limited to property taxes on the home it-
self. 20  The circuit court accepted this reasoning2' and concluded
16. Id.
17. Language can be found in Supreme Court opinions supporting either position.
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958) (federal tax lien "attaches consequences,
federally defined, to rights created under state law"). In Meyer v. United States, 375
U.S. 233 (1963), the Court explicitly relied on Bess but said, "once the tax lien has
attached to the taxpayer's state created interests, we enter the province of federal law;"
and "state law controls the determination of what is included within the [meaning of]
'property or rights to property"" Id. at 236, 238. See also United States v. Durham
Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1960); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509,
512-14 (1960). One student author concludes that the suggested meaning of Bess (fed-
eral law governs the attachment of the federal tax lien) was implicitly overruled by
Aquilino. Note, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 624, 627 (1961). In a later treatment of this issue
another commentator concludes otherwise. Comment, Property Subject to the Federal
Tax Lien, 77 Htav. L. REv. 1485, 1485-87, 1490-91 (1964) (finds support for Bess
in Aquilino and Durham Lumber Co.).
18. 475 F.2d at 679. It was stipulated in the district court that the lien attached
to Ralph's undivided one-half interest in the homestead. 338 F. Supp. at 805. There
is, however, language in the opinion of the court of appeals suggesting' the Opposite
conclusion. "[Esther's] interest was separate and apart from her husband and there-
fore precluded the homestead from being part of the husband's estate." 475 F.2d at
682.
19. See note 8 supra.
20. 338 F. Supp. at 808. In most states the homestead is subject to a lien for
taxes, while several permit the exemption to exclude only taxes on the homestead itself.
Compare N.C. CONsT. art. X, § 2(1), and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 3 (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1973), with Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.72 (Page 1953), and W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 38-9-3 (1966).
21. 475 F.2d at 681.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that the homestead provision gave Esther a vested undivided one-half in-
terest in the property. 2 The court was aided in its conclusion both by an
early Kansas case that described a wife's interest in the homestead as an
"estate"23 and by other cases in which the Kansas Supreme Court had
stated that the homestead provision was intended to create more than
"a simple exemption statute" and was to be construed liberally.24
However, Hershberger cited no Kansas case holding that the home-
stead exemption created a "property right" in either spouse. The court
rejected the argument that because a state court could divest either
spouse of his or her homestead rights in a divorce action, the home-
stead "prior to divorce was not a vested property right. ' 25  Moreover,
the court did not consider other Kansas law that described the interest
in the homestead as a waivable benefit.28  More to the point, the court's
conclusion in this regard may have been unnecessary as the wife al-
ready possessed an undivided one-half interest in the home by virtue
of her status as a joint tenant. The obvious suggestion is that the
homestead exemption would give a spouse vested property rights in the
homestead even if the other spouse held title as sole owner. Therefore,
the key to the Hershberger opinion was not that the homestead exemp-
tion vested a property right, but that it created an indivisible interest
in the property.
The real significance of this decision, though, lies in its holding
that a federal tax lien against one spouse may not be enforced against
his or her property rights in the homestead where the other spouse has
an indivisible interest in the property. This means that state law not
only defines what constitutes property rights within the language of
section 6321, but also determines whether the federal government can
enforce its lien against a delinquent taxpayer. It may be, as one au-
thority suggests, that the "resolution of this issue may depend upon
whether there is involved a single interest of the taxpayer who is subject
to tax liability, or whether both spouses have an interest while only one
is under a tax liability.112 7
The treatment accorded the federal tax lien by other courts in rela-
tion to state homestead exemptions offers little clarification. In
22. Id. at 682.
23. Helm v. Helm, 11 Kan. 19 (1873).
24. E.g., West v. Grove, 139 Kan. 361, 31 P.2d 10 (1934).
25. 475 F.2d at 680.
26. See Schloss v. Unsell, 114 Kan. 69, 71, 216 P. 1091, 1092 (1923); cf. Cole
v. Coons, 162 Kan. 624, 641, 178 P.2d 997, 1008 (1947) (concurring opinion).
27. 9 J. MERTBNS, supra note 13, at 205.
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only two other jurisdictions have courts held that a homestead exemp-
tion protects one spouse from levy or foreclosure for the tax debt of the
other spouse.2 In one of these jurisdictions, Texas, there is a conflict
in the cases; 29 and in the other, Oklahoma, the precedential value of the
cases is subject to serious doubt.30  A number of courts have enforced
a tax lien against one spouse's interest in the homestead property; 1
others have held the lien attachable to a single spouse's interest in the
homestead property, but because of the nature of the action, make no
mention of whether the lien could be enforced.3 2  The only principles
that seem free from doubt are that a lien will always attach to a tax-
payer's interest in the homestead, 3 and a homestead is not exempt
from seizure for the joint tax liability of both husband and wife. 4
A brief look at other joint property interests recognized in various
states and the susceptibility of these interests to the federal tax lien
28. Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944) (Oklahoma); Morgan v. Moy-
nahan, 86 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Tex. 1949); Bigley v. Jones, 64 F. Supp. 389 (W.D.
Okla. 1946); Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428 (1949).
29. Compare Morgan v. Moynahan, 86 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Tex. 1949), and Pad-
dock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428 (1949), with United States v. Stone,
57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9864 (E.D. Tex. 1957), and Staley v. Vaughn, 50 S.W.2d 907
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932), and Staley v. Hopkins, 9 F.2d 976 (N.D. Tex. 1925).
30. The principal case, and the one relied on in Hershberger, is Jones v. Kemp,
144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944). The court in Kemp held that the Oklahoma home-
stead law did not create an "estate" in the wife but rather a "special and peculiar"
interest, which prevents a tax lien against the husband from being enforced against the
homestead. Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, on two different occasions
has flatly stated that the Oklahoma homestead provision does not create any property
rights in a spouse but merely a privilege of exemption from execution. Evans v. Evans,
301 P.2d 232, 234 (Okla. 1956); Mercer v. McKeel, 188 Okla. 280, 284, 108 P.2d
138, 141 (1940). As recognized by the Hershberger court itself, 475 F.2d at 682,
state homestead laws conferring privileges and exemptions are subordinate to the fed-
eral tax lien. Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964); Weitzner v.
United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963). Fur-
thermore, the Kemp court held that Mrs. Kemp was not the lawful wife of Mr. Kemp
at the time the tax lien attached and thus could not assert homestead rights. 144
F.2d at 481. The only other decision, Bigley v. Jones, 64 F. Supp. 389 (W.D. Okla.
1946), directly relied on Kemp.
31. E.g., Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 913 (1963); United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 831 (1947); United States v. Olgeirson, 284 F. Supp. 655 (D.N.D. 1968);
United States v. Tressler, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. If 9228 (S.D. Cal. 1966); United States
v. Heasley, 170 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.D.), af 'd, 272 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1959); Bedami
v. Tomlinson, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1471 (S.D. Fla. 1954).
32. E.g., Carter v. United States ex rel. D.I.R., 399 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1968);
Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964); Aronow v. United States, 65-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9692 (D. Mont. 1965); Jamison v. Geers, 35-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9319
(W.D. Okla. 1935).
33. E.g., Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1942); United States
v. Howard, 296 F. Supp. 264 (D. Ore. 1968); Birch v. Dodt, 2 Ariz. App. 228, 407
P.2d 417 (1965).
34. E.g., United States v. Estes, 450 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1971).
700 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
proves useful. Tenancy by the entirety, peculiar to the husband and
wife relationship and recognized in twenty-one states, 85 has proved par-
ticularly troublesome to the federal tax collector. Since legal title is
vested in the fictional unity of marriage, neither spouse, nor his or her
creditors, can force a partition.3 6  A substantial minority of states
recognizing tenancy by the entirety, however, permit creditors of one
spouse to reach a half-interest in the estate, subject to the other spouse's
rights.sr In these states, the tax lien provides the federal government
with the same rights as ordinary creditors. But in the majority of the
states, the government is not only denied the right to levy upon or fore-
close an entirety interest, but is also denied the protection of the lien.,,
The federal tax collector has fared better against the taxpayer's in-
terests in joint tenancies and community property. In the case of joint
tenancies, the government may enforce its claim against the delinquent
taxpayer's interest by a sale of the whole property even though there are
third parties whose interests are not subject to the lien. 0 Since the
government's rights under the lien are no greater than those of the tax-
35. See generally 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PoPERTY f 622-23 (1967).
36. Id. at 623; Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1172 (1961); Annot., 166 A.L.R. 969
(1947).
37. See note 36 supra.
38. See Benson v. United States, 442 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cole v. Car-
dozo, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. American Nat'l Bank, 255 F.2d
504 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 835 (1958); Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620
(3d Cir. 1952); United States v. Hutcheson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951). This rule
also extends to rents and profits derived from entirety property. See Moore v. Glotz-
bach, 188 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Va. 1960). Contra, Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp.
397 (D. Alas. 1960).
Tenancies by the entirety have been harshly criticized as creating "a privileged
sanctuary from the collection of federal taxes, a fictional bicephalous non-tax-paying
personality which is permitted to accumulate wealth free of the citizenship obligations
of either of the individuals who comprise the unit and for whose exclusive benefit it
exists." Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade II, 77
YALE L.J 605, 636 (1968). For a more favorable view of entirety interests see Com-
ment, Federal Lien Provisions and State Law: The Problem of Giving Effect to Both
in the Area of Joint Property Ownership, 25 Sw. L.J 456, 465 (1971).
In 1954 the House of Representatives made an effort to specifically include en-
tirety interests within the scope of § 6321, but the Senate rejected the effort because
it was "not clear what change in existing law would be made" by doing so. See H.R.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 406 (1954); S. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 575 (1954).
39. United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973); United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Mosolowitz, 269 F. Supp. 12 (D. Conn. 1967); United States v. Anderson, 66-2
U.S. Tax Cas. f 9646 (D.S.C. 1966); accord, Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d
3 (4th Cir. 1968). Contra, Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
Later cases in other circuits have rejected Folsom as misconstruing the language of
section 7403." United States v. Kocher, supra; United States v. Trilling, supra. Addi-
tionally, there are other factors that suggest the case may be distinguishable on its
facts. See Comment, 25 Sw. L.J., supra note 38, at 466.
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payer,40 the other joint tenants are protected to the extent that they re-
ceive their full share of the sale proceeds.41 Community property is
treated similarly. Even though each spouse is considered to have a
vested undivided interest in the community, the property is subject to
sale to satisfy a lien against only one of them.42 Thus, in those cases
where a delinquent taxpayer has a vested undivided interest in jointly
owned property, the tax lien can be enforced, regardless of the fact
that another person may have an equal or similar interest in the same
property. The one exception appears to be in those states that do not
subject tenancies by the entirety to creditor's claims. 4s There the
lien is ineffective, not because state law prohibits enforcement, but be-
cause a taxpayer does not have a separate property interest to which the
lien can attach.44
Under this reasoning, Esther's vested undivided interest in the home-
stead should not have been an obstacle to enforcement of the lien.
Similarly, characterization of that interest as an indivisible property
right should not have barred the efforts of the federal government to
reach legitimate property interests of the defaulting taxpayer. In United
States v. Overman,45 the argument was advanced that a Washington law
that exempted community property from a husband's premarital debts
was a rule of property law limiting "the extent and quality of his own-
ership rights" in the community.46 Therefore, the defendant taxpayer
contended that the tax lien could not be enforced against the husband's
rights in the property. But even assuming the characterization of the
Washington law as a property qualification was correct, the court said,
"all that section 6321 requires is that the interest be 'property' or
'rights to property.' It is of no statutory moment how extensive may
be those rights under state law, or what restrictions exist on enjoy-
ment of those rights."47
Clearly "[t]he attachment of a tax lien under section 6321 and
the enforcement of the lien under section 7403 . . .present different
.40. See, e.g., 9 J. MERTEhs, supra note 13, at 192-93.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Mosolowitz, 269 F. Supp. 12 (D. Conn. 1967).
42. E.g., Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Acker-
man, 424 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th
Cir. 1970); cf. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971).
43. See notes 35-36 supra.
44. E.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951) (husband's
interest in a tenancy by the entirety "like the rainbow in the sky or the morning fog
rising from the valley").
45. 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
46. Id. at 1145.
47. Id.
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questions."'48 But once the lien attaches, the enforcement is purely a
federal question.4 9 The only property that is exempt from seizure for a
tax debt is that immune from levy under section 6334(a).50 The obvi-
ous problem with allowing state homestead exemptions to extend the
minimal protection of Section 6334(a) is the inequities it would create
among delinquent taxpayers. The Internal Revenue Code is designed to
tax persons in equivalent positions equally. It would seem only fair to
subject equally situated individuals to the same liabilities when they
fail to pay their taxes. To do otherwise would mean that, depending
on how each state characterizes its homestead exemption, one taxpayer's
residence would be safe from the federal tax lien while another's would
be vulnerable.
This disparity would be further aggravated by the maximum ex-
emptions in each state. They range from nothing in those states that
do not have homestead provisions to 20,000 dollars in California."
Where the exemption is described in acreage rather than monetary
terms, one taxpayer may be immunized to the extent of a modest bun-
galo while a neighbor's exemption could run into the hundreds of thous-
ands of dollars. It may be argued that this is the result in those states
that recognize and exempt tenancy by the entirety. But tenancy by the
entirety is a common law property interest with deep roots in our Anglo-
American heritage. Homestead exemptions, on the other hand, regard-
less of whether construed as vesting property rights, are constitutional
and/or statutory overlays that can attach to almost any type of prop-
erty interest.
Denying a taxpayer the protection of homestead exemptions when
the government seeks to collect its tax dues may seem unnecessarily
harsh. It is, however, no different than the treatment accorded other
exemption laws designed to protect the impecunious. In bankruptcy,
where state exemption laws are normally given effect, 2 the federal lien
can be enforced against property set aside for the bankrupt.5 8 Disability
insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 4 alimony payments5
48. Id.
49. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
50. INT. REV. ConE OF 1954, § 6334(a). For a discussion of the limited nature
of the exemption, see 9 J. MERTENS, note 13 supra, at § 49.192.
51. CAL. CM. CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1973).
52. Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
53. United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
831 (1947).
54. Kane v. Burlington Savings Bank, 320 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1963).
55. Rev. Rul. 89, 1953-1 CuM. BuLL. 474; Campbell v. Campbell, 88 N.J. Super.
63, 210 A.2d 644 (1965).
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LIABILITY INSURANCE
and wages and salaries without a minimum for subsistence are" all sub-
ject to seizure.
The federal tax lien is wholly a federal creature and "matters di-
rectly affecting the nature or operation of [the lien] are federal ques-
tions, regardless of whether the federal statutory scheme specifically
deals with them or not."' . 7  The language of the statute specifies- that
there shall be a lien on "all property or rights to property" without ex-
ception. s If state law were to govern the attachment, a state could
place recognized property rights beyond the reach of the federal lien
and, thus, produce undesirable vagaries in the federal tax collection ef-
fort. The underlying policy of federal taxation is to insure as much
uniformity as possible.5 9 By permitting federal law to govern, courts
would be able "to subject to the lien the wide range of property inter-
ests commanded by the sweeping language of the statute, as well as to
exclude some interests as not being within the statutory purpose."60
In recent years, Congress has shown a tendancy to expand the cate-
gory of property exempt under section 6334(a).6 ' Hopefully, it will
recognize the need for uniformity with respect to protection of the home-
stead and expand section 6334(a) to include- provisions similar. to the
more progressive state homestead exemptions.
STUART T. WiL Ams
Liability Insurance-The Movable Link Between Coverage Denial
and Settlement Offers
Insurance litigation has produced uncertainty about a carrier's
obligations when its insured has caused damages beyond policy limits;
the insurer denies coverage to its insured because it believes, in good.
-56. Antrum v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 54 (D. Conn. i953).
57.. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 240 (1960). The Court, however,
recognized that when "Congress resorted to the use of liens, it came into an area of
complex property relationships long since settled and regulated by state law." Thus
the Court felt that in regards to divestiture of federal tax liens, -where there existed
well-established state procedures, state law should be adopted as a matter of federal
policy. Id. at 241-42. But see Comment, 25 Sw. L.J., supra note 38, at 460 n.43.
58. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321, quoted in note 3 supra.
59. E.g., United States v. Gilbert Associates, Txc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953); Burnet
v. Hamel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
60. Comment, 77 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 17, at 1503.
61. See 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 13, at § 49.192.
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